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Controlling Avian Inuenza in Chickens
A. Malani, M. Boni, A. Wickelgren, R. Laxminarayan
April 16, 2007
Highly pathogenic strains of the A/H5N1 subtype of inuenza  the so-called bird u
which has been intermittently infecting humans since May 1997  are thought to spread
from migratory waterfowl to chickens and then to humans [39]. Over 30 nations have
experienced an outbreak of bird u in their chicken populations and 285 humans1 have
been infected with H5N1. Although only 170 people have died from bird u [40], if the5
H5N1 subtype were to acquire the ability to spread from human to human, the ensuing
pandemic could cause an estimated 62 million or more humans deaths [26]. It has also
been predicted that a pandemic would have large economic costs, perhaps as much as a 4.7
percent reduction in U.S. gross domestic product alone [11, p. 12].
For most governments, the primary strategy against bird u is the development and10
stockpiling of antivirals and vaccines to limit human infection. Until an e¤ective treatment
is developed and as a precaution against the possible failure of treatment, however, many
countries also pursue a policy of culling chickens once they discover an H5N1 outbreak
among chickens. Indeed, since 2003 over 100 million chickens have been culled worldwide
[38].215
In this paper we compare the relative merits of the basic policies that governments em-
ploy to procure chickens for culling. In many developing countries, due to weak institutions
and limited social organization, the government cannot simply expect compliance with laws
requiring farmers to surrender chickens for culling. The government must pursue policies
that are narrowly incentive compatible to farmers. The most obvious of these policies20
to o¤er to purchase chickens ("buying chickens"). This is recommended by the World
Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization [37] and followed by numerous Southeast
University of Chicago, Resources for the Future and Princeton University, Northwestern University, and
Resources for the Future, respectively. Please send comments to amalani@uchicago.edu. We thank Eric
Wood for his research assistance and Saul Levmore, Roger Myerson, David Smith, and the audience at the
2007 Coase Lecture for their comments.
1As of this writing.
2Some countries such as China, Vietnam and Indonesia have also pursued a policy of vaccinating chickens
[25, 2, 10]. That policy is much less common than culling [37, p. iii]. We shall explore it, however, in a
future version of this paper.
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Asian countries. A complementary policy is to ban private chicken production or sales and
thereby lower the price at which the government can purchase chickens ("banning chick-
ens"). This is most notably practiced in Jakarta, Indonesia, the country with the highest25
number of human cases of H5N1 [1]. We also explore the procurement-related policies of
dumping healthy imported chickens or exchanging healthy imported chickens for domestic
chickens, though neither policy is currently practiced.
A cursory analysis reveals that the choice between simply buying chickens and banning
chickens to the price at which the government buys chickens depends on the prevailing30
market price of chickens and the cost of enforcing a ban. The problem, however, is more
complex. Government policy may alter the market price and supply of chickens. It may
also trigger changes in the ecology of u among chickens and thus humans. Indeed, it
can even alter the evolution of the inuenza virus. Therefore, we take an interdisciplinary
approach to the problem. We employ a model of the ecology of u in chickens and humans, a35
domestic and foreign market in chickens, and the evolution of inuenza to compare socially-
relevant equilibrium outcomes  namely the number of living, infected chickens and thus
humans  under each policy.
This approach yields four interesting conclusions. First, purchasing chickens generates
an economic incentive for farmers to increase their chicken populations by raising birth40
rates and practicing infection control on their farms. Better infection control decreases
the per capita probability that a healthy chicken becomes sick but this benecial e¤ect is
completely o¤set by a greater absolute number of healthy chickens. Thus the net ecological
e¤ect is completely due to higher birth rates which increase the population of sick chickens
and consequently the risk of human infection. Second, banning chickens has the economic45
e¤ect of encouraging farmers to export their chickens to neighboring regions. This has the
side e¤ect of spreading infection. (It has been alleged that is an important source of u
among chickens in Africa [8].) Thus an important complement to a ban on chickens is a
quarantine across regions if feasible. Third, a policy of importing healthy chickens may
increase the average quality of chickens and thus the price of chickens. This would have50
the perverse economic e¤ect of encouraging farmers to increase the population of chickens,
including sick chickens. Finally, any policy that alters infection control by farmers 
whether it raises price and thus infection control or lowers price and thus infection control
 will alter the evolution of the virus population. Depending on the ecology of u in
chickens, mainly whether it is capable of coinfection or superinfection, greater infection55
control can lead to the evolution of greater or lower virulence. These e¤ects change the
relative merits of purchasing or banning chickens.
This paper has practical relevance beyond bird u in chickens. For one thing, the
problem of animal-to-human transmission of infection occurs in other contexts. Cows with
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ("mad cow disease") cause Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob60
disease in humans and cows spread tuberculosis to humans. The former threat triggered
the mass culling of cattle in the UK in the 1990s [28] and the latter triggered mass slaughters
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in the rst half of the 20th century [27]. In both cases governments resorted to some form
of compensation to encourage farmers to cooperate with culling e¤orts [14, 4]. Moreover,
the analysis of government procurement not just of animal stock but any product or service65
is as our paper illustrates complicated by the ability of the government to ban private
market sales and thus lower the price it must pay. Often this strategy has important
behavioral side e¤ects [23]. In our case the result is a spread of infection to other regions.
This paper belongs in the literature on economic epidemiology [32] because it addresses
the interaction between disease control and the economic behavior of humans. A formal70
distinction is that the host is an animal, but one that does not qualitatively alter the analy-
sis because humans have an economic interest in the host. Nor is the introduction of
incomplete information new, as previous papers have modeled incomplete information in
the market for sexual partners [REF]. A minor distinction is that, whereas those papers
examine demand for information on disease status, we examine the impact of incomplete75
information on government policy. A more important contribution of this paper is that
it incorporates the interaction between disease control and evolution of disease. This pa-
per also belongs to the economic literature on renewable resource management specically
sheries management. Like Kremer and Morcom [21] and Brown and Leyton [9, pp. 34-35],
we account for storage and its qualitative equivalent, exports. Here incomplete informa-80
tion is important because government dumping of the natural resource may not discourage
exploitation since it increases the average quality and thus price of those resources.
Finally our paper relates to the evolutionary biology literature on niche construction
[30, 31], which is the process by which a species alters its environment and thus a¤ects
the selection pressures exerted by that environment on either its own or another species85
evolution. Pathogens, as it turns out, are classic niche constructors; they can alter host
behavior [6], construct immunity [7], and enhance host susceptibility [15], to give just a
few examples. In the analysis presented here, we study how government intervention can
alter the evolution of avian inuenza in chickens. The resulting evolved population of avian
inuenza viruses will most likely feed back into our preferences for infection control and90
thus procurement strategies.
We shall begin our analysis with the assumption that neither farmers, consumers nor
the government can practicably distinguish chickens infected with H5N1 from non-infected
chickens. (As is common in the economics literature, however, we shall assume all three
know the proportion of all chickens in a market that are infected with H5N1.) This as-95
sumption, which denes what we call the "symmetric fully incomplete information" case,
makes it di¢ cult to identify and procure only sick chickens. This introduces average quality
into the demand for chickens in a way that complicates procurement. Specically, govern-
ment purchases of chickens increases farmersquantity supply but in a manner that alters
the average quality of that supply, which has a distinct feedback e¤ect on price. More-100
over, government imports of healthy chickens increases the average quality and thus price
in domestic chickens markets. We believe the assumption of fully incomplete information
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is justied for two reasons. First, inuenza is a stable, asymptomatic infection in birds
[36, 19]. Indeed, healthy looking chickens have tested positive for strains of H5N1 that are
less virulent to chickens [39, 41]. Moreover, asymptomatic u is a health threat because it105
has more access to humans [39, 41] and more time to mutate to survive and spread among
humans. The argument against treating avian u in chickens as a problem of fully incom-
plete information is that u strains which are highly pathogenic  also known as HPAI
strains  cause symptomatic and thus more observable infection in chickens, and strains
that are more highly pathogenic to chickens are also thought to be more highly pathogenic110
in general ([19], but see the discussion in [18]).3 Because identication of HPAI infections
in chickens is less than perfect, we shall explore as an extension a model with "symmetric
partially incomplete information." That case, it will be shown, has dynamics very similar
to the fully incomplete information case.
Part 1 presents a model of the ecology of u in chickens. Part 2 presents the prot115
maximization problem for chicken farmers and identies optimal behavior by farmers given
steady state infection rates among chickens. Part 3 justify the governments objective
function based on a model of the ecology of u in humans. It also compares the two
basic policies buying chickens or banning chicken sales  for procuring chickens. Part
4 introduces export markets and storage, chicken imports, disease evolution, and partially120
incomplete information to the analysis. Part 5 discusses our ndings.
1 Ecology of u among chickens
Let xh be the number of non-infected chickens and xs be the number of chickens infected
with bird u. We shall call the former healthy chickens and the latter sick chickens. On
an individual chicken farm we can describe the dynamics of healthy and sick chickens with125
the standard set of dynamical equations [3]:
_xh = b  zxhxs (1)
_xs = zxhxs   vxs (2)
where the dots represent time derivative, b is the birth rate of chickens, v is disease-induced
death rate (or virulence), z is the contact parameter among chickens (which can be controlled130
with infection control measures by individual farmers), and  is the transmissibility of
inuenza in chickens via the oral-faecal route. We assume that birth rate is independent
of the chicken population because the farmer controls birth rate through his disposal of
fertilized eggs. We ignore natural death rates because in our model all chickens are raised
3This is because all the HPAI strains have a sequence of basic amino acid residues at the HA cleavage
site; this aa-sequence confers higher replication levels and more pathogenicity in humans, birds, possibly
mice [REF], and probably most animals that are capable of being infected by u.
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for human consumption. Indeed, (1) and (2) are best viewed as describing the dynamics135
of healthy and sick chickens intended for human consumption.
The above system has a stable endemic equilibrium where
x^h = v=z and x^s = b=v (3)
so the equilibrium number of total chickens is
x^ =
bz + v2
zv
(4)140
Let
q^ =
x^h
x^
=
v2
bz + v2
(5)
be the fraction of a farmers chickens that are healthy. Going forward, we shall refer to
this as the quality of chickens. (We shall also continue the practice of labeling ecological
steady state values with hats.)145
There are three relevant properties of this equilibrium. First, higher fertility does not
a¤ect the equilibrium population of healthy chickens. The absence of an e¤ect is a result of
higher birth rates increasing the number of new susceptibles per unit time which, in turn,
increases the equilibrium number of sick chickens. A higher equilibrium number of sick
chickens increases the per capita probability a healthy chicken will become infected, which150
exactly o¤sets the increased birth rate of healthy chickens. Second, better infection control,
which corresponds to lower contact rates, increases the population of healthy chickens, not
sick chickens. Lower contact rates are exactly o¤set by an increase the number (and
thus availability) of healthy chickens that sick chickens can infect. Nevertheless, and as
expected, infection control does increase the total population of chickens for consumption,155
@x^=@z =  v=z2 < 0. (Note that, because they a¤ect the ow equations identically,
transmissibility and contact rates have the same e¤ect on population.) Third, increased
virulence not only lowers the population of sick chickens, it increases the population of
healthy chickens. Lower virulence decreases the number of sick chickens that can infect
healthy chickens, thus increasing the numbers available for consumption.160
2 A farmers incentives
The typical chicken farm in the developing world is run by a small, price-taking farmer
[34, 33, 35]. Let p be the market price of chickens for human consumption,4 r (b) the cost
4Chickens may be sold live in "wet" markets or slaughtered. Di¤erent parties in the two markets
slaughter the chickens and slaughtering poses a risk of chicken-to-human contagion. We ignore this and
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of raising b chickens,5 and  c (z) be the cost of infection control. As is usual, we assume
costs are increasing and convex, that is, r0 > 0, r00 > 0, c0 < 0, and c00 > 0. The farmers165
objective is to choose birth rate and infection control to maximize prots from sales of
chickens:
max
b;z
phxh (b; z) + psxs (b; z)  r (b)  c (z)
subject to the ecological conditions (1) and (2).6 Because we assume that neither farmers
nor consumers can distinguish sick chickens, both types of chickens earn the same price p
and the farmers objective can be written170
max
b;z
px (b; z)  r (b)  c (z)
Because we shall focus on steady state results, the ecological conditions reduce to their
endemic equilibrium value (4).7
The farmer will choose fertility such that
r0 (b) = p  (1=v) (6)
that is, the marginal cost of a fertilized egg equals the marginal value of that egg. The175
value of the egg is price of each chicken it yields times the expected number of chickens it
yields. Since in steady state birth rates only a¤ect the number of sick chickens, which die
at a rate v, the marginal number of chickens each egg yields is 1=v. If the cost of infection
control satises the second order condition c00 (z) > 2pv=z3, then the farmers will choose
a level of infection control such that180
 c0 (z) = p   v=z2 (7)
that is, the marginal cost of control is equal to the monetary value of the marginal benet to
his total ock of chickens. If the second order condition is not satised, then it is optimal
for the farmer to practice maximal infection control. The ecological dynamics are such
other distinctions between the two markets. This is justied if price adjusts for the cost and risks of
slaughtering. In developing countries, most chickens are sold in wet markets because of the scarcity of
refrigeration systems to preserve chicken meat.
5One could substitute a market for fertilized chicken eggs for r (b). So long as the supply of eggs is
upward sloping, this would not change the our prediction of the e¤ect of government chicken procurement
on the farmers choice of fertility level. Even if supply is xed, so long as heterogeneity in chicken farmer
costs traces out a positive aggregate demand curve for eggs, our prediction would be unchanged.
6Because we assume all farms are identical, we can account for farm-to-farm spread of u among chickens
[39] without modifying the ecological model. All that is required is that c0 (z) =1.
7Although we present this problem as a static maximization problem subject to constraints implied by
the steady state of the ecological model, the results are identical to the steady state solution to a dynamic
optimization problem with an innite horizon.
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that this does not require the farmer to drive z down to zero. Once z gets below some185
critical level zcrit = v=xh > 0, the population of sick chickens will decline ( _xs < 0) and
the pathogenic strains of the disease will disappear from the chicken population. We shall
proceed, however, assuming the second order condition for z is satised.
Because it will be relevant to our policy analysis, let us examine the e¤ect of price
shocks on the farmers choice of fertility and infection control. Di¤erentiating the farmers190
optimality conditions with respect to price reveals
@b
@p
=
1
vr00 (b)
> 0 (8)
@z
@p
=
vz
2pv   z3c00 (z) < 0 (9)
Intuitively, if the price of chickens rises, the farmer will want to supply more chickens. One
way to do this is to increase birth rates. Another is to reduce infection, which may kill195
chickens before they reach the market. While it should be obvious that @x^s=@p > 0 and
@x^=@p > 0, it is interesting to note that
@q^
@p
= q^ (1  q^)

 1
z
@z
@p
  1
b
@b
@p

(10)
is ambiguous in sign because a price shock causes farmers to increase birth rates (which
raises the number of sick chickens) but decrease the contact rates (which raises the number200
of healthy chickens). Writing this last equation more succinctly as "q = (1  q^) ( "z   "b),
where " indicates elasticity with respect to price, it is evident that a higher price might
lower the quality of a farmers ock if the price elasticity of birth rates is greater than that
of contact rates. These elasticities will in turn depend on the convexity of the cost functions
r and c.205
To fully identify the farmers decision, we must determine how prices are set. We shall
assume for simplicity that the chicken market is supplied by N identical farmers. Because
we assume consumers cannot distinguish a sick chicken from a healthy one but know the
fraction of chickens that are sick, aggregate demand is a function of both the average quality
of farmerschickens and price: D (q^; p) where Dq > 0 and Dp < 0. The equilibrium price210
is that which clears the market
Nx^ = D (q^; p)
that is, which equates aggregate supply and demand. Importantly, for the market to be in
a stable equilibrium, demand must be falling in price after accounting for farmer behavior,
specically (10). This implies Nx^p  Dq q^p  Dp > 0.
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Although it is not strictly relevant to our policy analysis, it is instructive to compare215
the behavior of the price-taking farmer with that of a monopolist farmer. Because the
monopolist can inuence price, his problem is
max
b;z
p (q^ (b; z)) x^ (b; z)  r (b)  c (z)
The monopolist will set birth rate and infection control such that
r0 (b) = p  1
v
  pqv
bz + v2
< p  1
v
 c0 (z) = p  v
z2
+
pqvb
z (bz + v2)
> p  v
z2
220
Because costs are convex, this implies that the monopolist will maintain a smaller ock and
practice more infection control than the price-taking farmer. The reason is that a higher
birth rate increases only the number of sick chickens and thus lowers quality and price. It
is obvious that higher contact rates also reduce quality and price. Unlike the price-taker,
the monopolist internalizes these costs. Indeed, this constitutes an argument for corporate225
farms that di¤ers from the standard claim that such farms by their production process
reduce contact rates between chickens and humans. Our prediction is that corporate farms
may also reduce the extent of sickness among chickens. Yet the average developing world
chicken farmer is a price taker, therefore the remainder of the paper shall proceed under
that assumption.230
3 The governments problem
3.1 Justifying the governments objective
Presumably, governments care directly about humans and not chickens. There are two
ways, however, that sick chickens a¤ect human welfare. First, they may reduce overall
consumer plus producer surplus in chicken markets. Although the government does not235
ordinarily care about the quality of products, in the case of chickens lower quality may be
due to an externality. Because of incomplete information, farmers with sick chickens reduce
the price that farmers with healthy chickens can obtain in the marketplace. This is true
in our model even though all farmers are identical. Second, and more importantly, sick
chickens may infect humans. Since this paper is primarily about the threat of bird u240
to humans, we shall focus exclusively on the health risk from sick chickens. We believe
this is justied because the overriding motivation for existing government programs to cull
chickens is to reduce the risk of human infections.
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To arrive at the governments objective function, we employ another simple S-I model
for the ecology of u among humans:245
_yh = dyh   wxsyh   yh (11)
_ys = xsyh   (+ ) ys (12)
where d is the birth rate of humans,  is the transmissibility from chickens to humans, w is
the contact rate between chickens and humans,  is the natural death rate of humans, and
 is the mortality rate among humans infected with bird u.250
Given that roughly 60 percent of human H5Np1 infections result in mortality within
weeks [40], we can presume  is very very large. If we suppose that the governments goal
is to maintain the existing population growth rate and that the government cannot alter
fertility or non-u mortality rates in the short-run, and until the government can nd an
antiviral or vaccine to lower , the governments problem reduces to minimizing wxs. A255
policy of culling sick chickens, by reducing contact rates and the supply of sick chickens,
furthers this end. Since culling is equivalent to reducing the number of non-culled chickens,
we can state the governments narrow objective as to minimize the number of chickens that
it fails to cull, Xs Xgs, where Xs is the aggregate supply of sick chickens in a market and
Xgs is number of chickens the government culls.260
3.2 Constraints on the government
The problem, as we stated in the introduction, is that many governments cannot simply
mandate farmers surrender their chickens for culling. Therefore, the government must
pursue narrowly incentive compatible policies to procure chickens for culling. In this
section we explore two such policies, either buying chickens outright or combining a ban on265
chicken sales with purchases of chickens at depressed prices.8 We can compare these two
policies by writing the governments loss function as
L = ' (Xs  Xgs) + k (f) + gXg (13)
where ' is the monetary-equivalent value of the health risk from non-culled chickens, f is
the sanction on chicken sales, k is the cost of administering that sanction, g is the price270
at which the government o¤ers to purchase chickens from farmers, and Xg is the number
of chickens that the government purchases from farmers. We assume k0 > 0 and k00 < 0.9
The governments problem is to minimize loss by its choice of (f; g;Xgs).
8We shall assume the sanction on chicken sales is paid by the consumer rather than the farmer, though
it shall make little di¤erence to the analysis. A sanction on farmers would be implemented by changing the
farmers return from chicken sales to p  s and removing the sanction from market demand, i.e., @D=@s = 0.
9 If the government can enforce a tax on chicken sales, then it can raise revenues via a ban on sales. The
cost of the sanction would be  t (Xs  Xgs) + k (t). This would have the e¤ect of lowering the cost of a
9
Due to our assumption of incomplete information, the government (like consumers)
cannot buy only sick chickens. Rather it must buy any chicken and its yield of sick275
chickens is
Xgs = (1  q)Xg (14)
The government is subject to a number of additional constraints. The most important is
the farmers response to the governments o¤er to buy chickens. If we let  be the fraction
of his ock that a farmer sells to the government, then the farmers best-response constraint280
is
max
;b;z
[(1  ) p+ g]x (b; z)  r (b)  c (z) (15)
Since the government can only purchase chickens that the farmer sells, government purchases
are constrained by
Xg = Nx (16)285
Moreover, the governments o¤er is indirectly constrained by the market clearing condition
Nx = D (q; f;Xg; p) (17)
where Df < 0 and DXg > 0. Finally, both the government and the farmer are constrained
by the ecological model (1) and (2).
We shall simplify this problem in two steps. First, we derive the optimality conditions290
for the farmers response (in the ecological steady state) and substitute them for (15). In
particular, the optimality conditions for sales  to the government is g p = 0. This implies
that the government cannot procure any chickens unless it matches the market price for
chickens. (O¤ering any higher price is a waste of money.) Suppose the government complies
and o¤ers g = p. Then the farmer will be indi¤erent between selling to the government and295
to private consumers. Therefore, the government can choose  for the farmer. Moreover,
the optimality conditions for b and z simplify to (6) and (7). Plugging in the incomplete
information constraint (14) and the voluntary sales constraint (16) in the governments loss
function now allows the governments problem to be restated more concisely as
min
;f
' (1  )Nx^s (b; z) + k (f) + pNx^ (b; z) (18)300
subject to the farmers optimality conditions (6) and (7), the market clearing condition
Nx^ = D (q^; f; ; p), and the ecological conditions (3) - (5).
ban. However, if the government also cares about raising revenue, a tax may have the perverse e¤ect of
lowering the incentive of the government to procure chickens. For simplicity we assume a non-tax sanction
on chickens.
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Second, we reformulate all key parameters except the control variables as functions of
price. We derived the relationship between price and farmersoptimal choice of (b; z) and
thus (x^s; x^) in (8) - (9) from Part 2. Moreover, we can totally di¤erentiate the market305
clearing constraint Nx^ (p) = D (q^ (p) ; f; ; p) with respect to price to obtain
@p
@
=
D
Nx^p  Dq q^p  Dp > 0;
@p
@f
=
Df
Nx^p  Dq q^p  Dp < 0 (19)
due to the stability of the market equilibrium. The governments problem then simplies
to
min
;f
' (1  )Nx^s (p) + k (f) + pNx^ (p) (20)310
subject to (8) - (9) and (19).
3.3 Optimality conditions
Government purchases and sanctions have direct e¤ects on loss as well as indirect e¤ects
through price. To understand the price e¤ect, observe that an increase in price has three
e¤ects on the governments loss:315
@L
@p
= Nx^+ pN
@x^
@p
+ ' (1  )N @x^s
@p
> 0 (21)
First, it raises the amount the government pays for the fraction of chickens it buys. Second,
it has the dynamic e¤ect of raising the number of sick chickens farmers produce and thus
the number of sick chickens in the fraction that the government does not purchase. Third,
the dynamic e¤ect also increases the total number of chickens farmers produce and, given320
that the government cannot distinguish sick and healthy chickens, the total number the
government purchases.
Assuming the governments problem has an interior solution, the government should
choose the fraction of chickens to purchase so that marginal benet equals marginal cost:
'Nx^s = pNx^+
@L
@p
@p
@
(22)325
The benet (on the left-hand side) of purchasing chickens is to reduce the number of sick
chickens the government fails to purchase. The direct cost of government purchases is
simply the payment for chickens. The indirect cost is that government demand raises the
market price. Likewise, the government should choose its sanction so that
@L
@p
 @p
@f

= k0 (f) (23)330
11
The benet of sanctions is that they reduce the price of chickens. The cost is simply that
of implementation.
There are two things to note about the governments optimal choices. First, because of
the economic costs of procurement, the government may not want to purchase all chickens
despite the ecological risks from these chickens. Though in other contexts an ecological335
argument such as herd immunity may be advanced to support this claim, it is inapt here
because the specic ecology of u in humans is such that the risk to humans is linear in the
number of non-culled sick chickens.10 Second, sanctions and purchases are complementary.
Fines lower the price the government must pay and thus the cost of purchases. Unless the
costs of sanctions are unbelievably prohibitive, it is tempting to conclude that a government340
should always couple a compensation program for farmers with at least a partial ban on
private sales. In the next section, however, we consider extensions to the model that
challenge these conclusions.
4 Extensions
4.1 Export markets and storage345
The governments problem becomes more challenging when a farmer can either export
chickens to other provinces or store chickens until a government ban on private sales expires.
Because these two problems are mathematically similar, we shall model export markets and
extrapolate to storage.
Suppose a farmer has access to an export market. Let superscript F designate foreign350
market variables and  be the cost of transporting a chicken to the foreign market. The
domestic farmers problem (in ecological steady state) becomes
max


(1  ) p+ pF  x^ (b; z)  r (b)  c (z)
where  is the fraction of his ock a farmer exports. Although the individual farmers
optimality condition suggests he will either export all his ock (if pF    > p) or none of
it, the market clearing condition for the domestic and foreign markets355
N (1  ) x^ = D (q^; f; ; p) (24)
Nx^+NF x^F = DF
 
q^F ; pF

(25)
will ensure that p  pF    in equilibrium, though possibly after some chickens have
been exported. For simplicity we have ignored imports in the market clearing conditions.
10To be clear, we are do not dispute that herd immunity may be possible among chickens in model
described by (1) and (2). We are noting that the infection of humans described by (11) and (12) does not
permit herd immunity as the infection is from chickens, not infected humans.
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Exports will equilibrate markets both by reducing foreign price and increasing domestic360
price.
If the government cares about human infection in the export market, that market will
complicate the governments problem by replacing the single market clearing condition (17)
with dual conditions (24) and (25) or by adding the no-exports constraint
p > pF    (26)365
Let   0 be the multiplier on this last constraint. Then the optimality condition (23) for
sanctions becomes
 @L
@p
@p
@f
=
k0 (f)
N
+ 
Thus the no-exports constraint increases the marginal costs of sanctions. Intuitively, do-
mestic sanctions lower domestic price. If they lower prices such that p < pF  , farmers will
export their chickens sick and healthy to other provinces, which spreads the infection.370
There are three additional things to note about exports. First, although the risk of
exports is perhaps intuitive to economists, it highlights for ecologists an important risk
from trade. Not only does trade provide a physical pathway for the spread of disease,
but the economic pressures that generate trade tend to spread disease. To see this more
clearly, note that an increase in the initial quality of chickens in foreign markets increases375
pF and that the higher is pF the more constraining is (26). This implies that farmers with
relatively sicker chickens seek out markets with relatively healthier chickens when it is not
possible for consumers to distinguish sick from healthy chickens. Second, a natural solution
to exports is a quarantine, enforced either as a ban on exports by the domestic market or a
ban on imports by the foreign market. Or, if imports cannot be distinguished from exports380
(perhaps due to domestic farmersability to mask their exports), a solution is sanctions on
all private chicken sales in the foreign market. Of course a quarantine or additional ban
requires additional enforcement, which will again increase the costs of sanctions. Third,
o¤ering a higher price for domestic chickens is a form of economic quarantine. This is
evident from the optimality condition (22) for , which becomes385
'x^s +  = px^+
@L
@p
@p
@
with the no-exports constraint. O¤ering a higher price for chickens reduces the incentive
of domestic farmers to export their chickens.
Finally, our analysis of exports can be extended to storage. From a static perspective,
storage is similar to an export market except that the target is a future domestic market.
The cost of transportation  can be re-interpreted as the cost of storage. A better approach390
to modeling storage is to treat stored chickens as another state variable [21]. The advantage
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of that approach is that it accounts for the e¤ect of storage on future domestic prices.
Accounting for that e¤ect, however, is unnecessary to obtain the central insight that storage
is another method of evading current domestic sanctions. The social cost of storage is that
sick chickens contaminate future ocks. The immediate implication for the governments395
problem is that current domestic price is constrained to be less that the discounted future
price minus the cost of storage, i.e., p (t) < e rjp (t+ j)    . The way to relax this
constraint is to extend the duration of sanctions, the analogue to extending the geographic
scope of sanctions in the case of exports.
4.2 Chicken imports and exchanges400
In a seminal paper on the management of elephant populations when poachers can store
tusks, Kremer and Morcom [21] suggest that governments also stock up on tusks and
threaten to dump them if tusk prices rise to a level that makes poaching protable. The
idea is that the governments supply will drive down prices and make both poaching and the
storage of tusks unprotable again.11 The analogous proposal for the chickens problem is405
that the government purchase foreign chickens and dump them in the domestic market. If
dumping drove down chicken prices, it would lower the cost of purchasing chickens. There
is an important complication, however, in the incomplete information case. Price depends
not only on the quantity of chickens, but also the average quality of chickens. If the gov-
ernment purchases and dumps healthy foreign chickens, it may raise the domestic price of410
chickens because the foreign chickens will increase the average quality of chickens in the
local market.12
We can capture this dynamic in the formal model by modifying the governments ob-
jective in (20) to be
max
;f;g
' (1  )Nx^s (p) + k (f) + pNx^ (p) + pFXFg
where pF is the market price in the foreign market in which the government buys chickens,415
XFg is the number of healthy chickens the government buys in that market. With no
loss in insight, we assume the government does not sell the healthy chickens but simply
gives them away and we ignore exports. The new domestic market clearing condition is
Nx^+XF = D (q^; f; ; p), where quality is now
q^ =
Nx^h +X
F
Nx^+XF
11A similar idea is found in [5, pp. 173-175] and [9, pp. 34-35].
12The government can avoid this problem if it can clearly label the imported chickens as healthy, keep
those chickens healthy even after they are imported, and stop domestic farmers from masking their chickens
as imported. All three are big "ifs."
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Totally di¤erentiating the market clearing condition with respect to price yields420
@p
@XF
=
Dq
 
@q^=@XFg
  1
Nx^p  Dq q^p  Dp
Downward sloping demand implies the denominator is negative. Therefore the e¤ect of the
governments imports on price depends on which is greater: the positive e¤ect on quality
or the negative e¤ect from additional supply. Although at some point government imports
will reduce price, it is possible that over a large range they only raise price. In that case,
optimal government imports are zero as they have no benet, only costs. This can be425
veried by examination of the optimality condition
 @L
@p
@p
@XF
= XF
@pF
@XF
+ pF
where the left-hand side are the possible marginal benets (driving down domestic price)
and the right-hand side are the clear marginal costs (the direct costs of purchasing chickens
in foreign markets).
There are three important notes to this observation. First, an alternative strategy that430
always lowers domestic price is importing sick chickens or at least chickens as sick as the
typical chicken in the domestic market.13 The obvious and controlling risk of this policy,
however, is that it increases the risk of human infection and, in any event, is politically
unpalatable. Second, dumping chickens from a competing foreign market into an export
market can reduce the price that domestic farmers get from exports. Like a quarantine,435
this policy may be useful as a complement to domestic sanctions. The price of foreign
healthy chickens is likely to be greater, however, than the price of lower quality domestic
chickens. Unless the price elasticity of the competing foreign market supply is much less
than the price elasticity of the domestic market supply, it is surely less expensive to simply
purchase more domestic chickens and reduce domestic sanctions.440
Third, an alternative to merely dumping healthy foreign chickens is to exchange them
with farmers for the farmerslower quality domestic chickens. Although exchange will not
reduce domestic quantity supply and thus price, it will replace sick chickens with healthy
chickens. If farmers anticipate this policy, however, they will increase birthrates and
reduce infection control before it is implemented because the policy portends an increase in445
price due to an increase in the quality of chickens. After all, the exchange is equivalent to
"curing" each sick chicken and making it healthy. This increase in birth rates and reduction
in infection control will increase the risk of human infection in the periods leading up to
the policy. Moreover, whether farmers anticipate this policy or not, this policy is surely
13This is similar to Brown and Laytons (2001) proposal to dump lower quality but indistinguishable white
rhino horns to drive down the price of black rhino horms.
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more expensive than simply purchasing all domestic chickens unless the price elasticity of450
the foreign market supply is much less the price elasticity of the domestic market supply.
4.3 Evolution of virulence
An important challenge for the control of bird u is that the inuenza virus is capable of
rapid evolution. Because of the large amount of variation in inuenza virus populations,
strong selection pressures can alter average traits of the viral population on a time scale of455
just a few years [22] and probably months [REF]. Since infection control is an important
source of selection pressure, and procurement policies, by altering the price of chickens,
alter incentives for infection control, evolution may a¤ect the determination of optimal
procurement policy.
The di¢ culty with incorporating evolution into our analysis of procurement is that the460
e¤ect of infection control on the evolution of u varies dramatically depending on the specic
ecology of u on chicken farms. The literature on the evolution of virulence indicates that
inuenza virulence could evolve to be greater, lower, or be una¤ected depending on (i) the
extent of coinfection and superinfection, (ii) the type of infection control, (iii) the ability of
a farmer to identify a sick chicken, and (iv) whether the analysis is carried with equilibrium465
methods or non-equilibrium methods. Coinfection is dened as one strain of a pathogen
infecting an already infected host without displacing the resident strain. Superinfection
occurs when one strain of a pathogen infects an already infected host and completely replaces
the resident strain.
The most basic equilibrium method suggests that infection control should not have470
any e¤ect on the pathogens optimal virulence (equation (5) in Day [12]) while the most
basic non-equilibrium method seems to indicate that infection control will lower virulence
(equation (3.7) in Day and Gandon [13]). Day [12] also shows that virulence can increase
if infected hosts are quarantined (equation (14) and Figure 3) and Knolle [20] shows that
infection control can increase virulence by making the virus more of a generalist in terms475
of tissue tropism (although this mechanism may operate on a slightly slower time scale).
Gandon et al. [17] and equation (21) of Nowak and May [29] suggest that infection
control would decrease virulence in a viral population with superinfection dynamics. Also,
as noted by Gandon et al. [16], superinfecting parasites tend to be subject to selection for
the fastest within-host reproducers; thus, infection control can decrease the prevalence of480
within-host competition, which would in turn decrease the selective pressure for the more
rapid reproducers (which are more virulent). When viewing inuenza infections in chickens
as coinfections (rather than superinfections), equation (5) of May and Nowak [24] suggests
that mean virulence may increase if infection control is practiced. In reality, avian inuenza
infections in chickens probably exhibit both coinfection and superinfection dynamics. A485
specic evolutionary-epidemiological model would need to be built to analyze virulence
evolution when infection control is practiced on chicken farms.
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To explore the policy implications of the alternative evolutionary scenarios in a sim-
ple manner, we shall make the following assumptions concerning the evolution of u.
First, although it incorporates neither coinfection or superinfection, we shall retain the490
two-compartment model of u in chickens in (1) and (2). A proper model of superinfec-
tion would require a third compartment for the second strain of u and a proper model of
coinfection would require yet a fourth compartment for chickens infected with both strains
of chickens. The endemic equilibrium in either more complicated model, however, would
have the structure: x^h  z=v and x^s1 + x^s2 + x^s1;s2  b=v, where  and v are weighted495
averages of transmissibility and virulence, respectively, across strains s1 and s2. Because
these equations are similar to the endemic equilibrium (3) of the simpler ecological model,
there is little loss in ecological dynamics from using endemic equilibrium values from the
simpler model.
Second, we will model the e¤ect of infection control on evolution of average transmis-500
sibility and virulence in a ock simply by letting the previously exogenous parameters 
and v be functions of z, where 0 (z) < 0 and v0 (z) < 0 in the case where u is capable of
coinfection and 0 (z) > 0 and v0 (z) > 0 in the case where u is capable of superinfectionin
chickens. (Note that these functions describe long term values of  and v in the evolution-
ary time scale, that is, values of  and v after a few months or years.) Third, we shall505
assume that farmers do not account for the evolution of u when they choose birth rates
and infection control on their farms. We believe this is realistic because it is unlikely that
farmers in developing countries have either derived the equations of population genetics
or read papers that have derived the e¤ect of infection control on the evolution of u in
chickens.510
The e¤ect of evolution on optimal procurement will depend on two factors. One is
the immediate health risk to humans from heightened virulence of u in chickens. We shall
capture this by letting ' be a function of virulence and supposing that virulence in chickens
is positively correlated to virulence in humans [19], so that '0 (v) > 0. Because evolution
of virulence is driven by infection control and incentives for infection control are a function515
of price, the e¤ect of viral evolution on health risks to humans is a function of the e¤ect of
government policy on price.
The other factor that mediates the e¤ect of evolution on optimal procurement is the
e¤ect of evolution on the elasticity of chicken supply with respect to price. Comparative
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statics on the farmers problem reveals520
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The rst term on the right hand side of each line is the e¤ect of price on quantity or quality
holding evolution constant. This is the same as the e¤ect of price on farmer supply in earlier525
sections of the paper. The second term on the right hand side of each line is the e¤ect of
evolution. Because the evolutionary e¤ect is driven by infection control, it is mediated by
the e¤ect of price on infection control. Given our assumption that farmers do not account
for evolutionary dynamics in their choice of birth rates and infection control, the e¤ects of
price on these variables are the same as before.530
While it is evident that price now has a smaller, perhaps negative (larger positive) e¤ect
on the population of sick chickens in the case of coinfection (superinfection), its e¤ects on
total chickens and quality are ambiguous. It is theoretically possible that evolution with
either coinfection or superinfection can generate backward-bending regions in the supply
curve for total chickens. Assuming the market is at a stable equilibrium before government535
intervention, this raises the possibility that the government can have its cake and eat it
too. That is, the government can o¤er a higher price without increasing the supply of sick
chickens. (And unlike sanctions, this does not encourage exports.)
However, if we employ equilibrium methods as in Day [12] or Gandon et al. [17],
we can see this is very unlikely. In this approach selection operates to maximize the
viruss reproductive rate R0 = z (v) =v with respect to virulence, where  (v) is a function
that expresses the statistical correlation between transmissibility and virulence in a viral
population and 0 (v) > 0. It is easily shown that R0 maximization implies that "v = 1
where "v = 0 (v)  (v=) is the elasticity of transmissibility with respect to virulence.
Since models in the virulence evolution literature assume the evolution of transmissibility
is mediated by the evolution of virulence, it is the case that 0 (z) = 0 (v) v0 (z) and thus
0 (z) = = v0 (z) =v. This in turn yields
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where "vz = v0 (z)  (z=v) is the elasticity of virulence with respect to contact rates. This
is negative only if "vz <  xh=xs. Note that this is not possible with superinfection, which540
generates a positive elasticity between virulence and contact rates. It is also very unlikely
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even with coinfection. In an endemic equilibrium, the ratio of health chickens is likely to
be on the order of, say, 10 to 1. It is seems implausible that the elasticity of virulence with
respect to contact rates exceeds this value, that is, that a 10 percent decrease in contact
rates would increase evolved virulence by 100 percent. More plausible is an elasticity in the545
neighborhood of, if not less than, one. Therefore, it is very unlikely that virulence evolution
will generate backward bending supply and we proceed assuming otherwise. That is, price
probably has a smaller (larger) positive e¤ect on both the supply of sick chickens and of
total chickens in the case of coinfection (superinfection).
The two factors that mediate the e¤ect of evolution on policy the risk from virulence550
in chickens to humans and the e¤ect on the supply elasticity of chickens  in turn have
three discrete e¤ects on the governments optimality conditions. The rst two e¤ects can
be seen in the direct e¤ect of price on the governments loss:
@L
@p
= (1  )Nx^s'0 (v) @v
@z
@z
@p
+ Nx^+ pN
@x^
@p
+ ' (1  )N @x^s
@p
(27)
The health risk to humans from virulence in chickens is captured in the rst term. Given555
the higher prices encourage lower contact rates, this term is positive in the case of coinfec-
tion and negative in the case of superinfection. The e¤ect of evolution on supply elasticity
alters the last two terms. Both terms fall in the case of coinfection and rise in the case of
superinfection. Because the e¤ects of the two factors run in opposite directions, viral evo-
lution may either increase or decrease the governments loss in both the case of coinfection560
and of superinfection.
The third e¤ect of viral evolution on the governments optimality conditions only com-
plicates things further. The change in the price elasticity of quantity and quality supply
alters the denominator of (19) and thus the magnitude of the marginal e¤ect of government
purchases or sanctions on price. Even if we ignore the e¤ect on quality supply elasticity,565
which is ambiguous, we see that an increase in quantity supply elasticity lowers the e¤ect
of government interventions on price. This o¤sets the e¤ects these interventions have on
the direct e¤ect of price on government loss in (27).
The proper conclusion to draw from these muddled e¤ects is not that they can be
ignored. There is nothing to suggest that they nearly o¤set each other. Rather, these570
e¤ects may be important though their direction is unclear. To resolve this ambiguity one
must rst pin down the ecological dynamics among strains of u in chicken. Then it is
necessary to model the evolution of virulence in response to infection control. (Existing
studies tend to focus on evolution in the context of vaccination.) We plan to do this in a
future version of the present paper. Finally, it is necessary to estimate the basic elasticities575
that will dictate optimal policy, especially those between price and infection control and
between virulence in chickens and virulence in humans.
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4.4 Partially incomplete information
Thus far we have assumed that neither farmers, consumers, nor the government can identify
sick chickens. In this section we relax this assumption and demonstrate three things.580
First, diagnostic tests create two markets, one for ostensibly sick chickens and another for
ostensibly healthy chickens. If diagnostic tests generate false negatives, the government
may want to purchase not just ostensibly sick chickens but also ostensibly healthy ones.
Second, diagnostic tests complicate the governments problem, and not just because it must
now choose the fraction of chickens to buy and how much to sanction chicken production585
or sales in two markets rather than one. Consumer substitution across the markets for
ostensibly healthy and ostensibly sick chickens means that the governments behavior in
the two markets is not separable. Purchases or sanctions in the market for ostensibly
sick chickens, for example, will a¤ect demand and thus prices in the market for ostensibly
healthy chickens; those changes in turn will alter the governments optimal procurement590
policy in the ostensibly healthy chicken market. Third, despite these changes, the essential
trade-o¤s that guide the governments choice between a higher o¤er price and sanctions in
the partially incomplete information case are similar to those that guide the governments
choice in fully incomplete information case.
We shall introduce information on chickens via a diagnostic technology that identies595
sick chickens. As before we shall assume symmetric information across all actors, that is,
farmers, consumers and the government all have costless access to this technology. This
technology has sensitivity s and specicity h. This implies that the probability of a false
negative, that is, a sick chicken being mistaken for a healthy chicken, is 1   s, and the
probability of a false positive, that is, a healthy chicken being mistaken for a sick chicken,600
is 1  h. This implies that the number of ostensibly healthy and ostensibly sick chickens
in a ock are
wh = hxh + (1  s)xs
ws = (1  h)xh + sxs
where (xh; xs) are actually healthy and sick chickens, respectively.605
The farmers problem becomes
max
b;z
phwh + psws   r (b)  c (z) (28)
or, equivalently,
max
b;z
hxh + sxs   r (b)  c (z)
where (ph; ps) are now the market prices of ostensibly healthy and ostensibly sick chickens
and
h = hph + (1  h) ps and s = (1  s) ph + sps
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are the implicit prices of truly healthy and sick chickens. Because diagnostic technology
does not directly a¤ect the basic ecology of u in chickens, that is, equations (1) and (2),
the farmers decision remains subject to the constraints of that ecology, which in steady610
state are given by (3).
Farmers control birth rates and infection control, which through the ecology of u most
directly a¤ect the supply of actually healthy and actually sick chickens. Because an increase
in prices of either ostensibly healthy or ostensibly sick chickens increases the implicit price
of both actually healthy and actually sick chickens, an increase in price of chickens of
either ostensible quality causes an increase in the supply of chicken of both actual qualities.
Through this mechanism, the increase in price of chickens of either ostensible quality also
causes an increase in supply of chickens of both ostensible qualities. More succinctly,
@x^i=@pj > 0 and @w^i=@pj > 0 for all i 2 fh; sg and j 2 fh; sg. Further, we can dene the
actual quality of ostensibly health and ostensibly sick chickens as the probability that such
a chicken is actually healthy, that is,
q^h =
hx^h
hx^h + (1  s) x^s and q^s =

1  ^h

xh
1  ^h

xh + ^sxs
respectively. As before, an increase in price now of ostensible quality has ambiguous
e¤ects on actual quality.
Since there are two ostensible qualities of chickens, there are two markets for chickens.
Each must clear:615
Nw^h = Dh (q^h; fh; h; ph; ps) (29)
Nw^s = Ds (q^s; fs; s; ps; ph) (30)
where i and fi are the fraction of chickens the government buys and the governments
sanction on chickens in market i for i = fh; sg. Importantly, consumer substitution between
ostensibly healthy and sick chickens implies positive cross-price e¤ects on demand, that is,620
@Di=@pj > 0 for i; j 2 fh; sg and i 6= j. This does not disturb the result that an
increase in government purchases (sanctions) in one market increases (decreases) prices in
that market. But it does raise the possibility that either intervention in one market may
increase or decrease prices in the other. (It will remain true, however, that the direction
of e¤ect from government purchases will be the opposite of the direction of e¤ect from625
sanctions.)
Because there are false negatives and imperfect sensitivity, there are actually sick chick-
ens in each market. Therefore, the governments objective is to minimize the health risk
from sick chickens being sold in both private markets, keeping in mind the cost of purchasing
such chickens and of enforcing sanctions on each private market
min
h;s;fh;fs
'N [(1  h) (1  qh) w^h + (1  s) (1  qs) w^s] + hphNw^h + hphNw^s + k (fh; fs)
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subject to the ecological steady state (3), farmers problem (28) and the market clearing
conditions (29) and (30). Plugging in the denition of quality from above, the governments
loss function simplies to
'N [(1  h) (1  s) + (1  s) s] x^s + hphNw^h + hphNw^s + k (fh; fs)
Dene the direct e¤ect an increase in ostensibly healthy chicken and ostensibly sick
chicken price has on the governments loss as
@L
@ps
= 'N [(1  s) s + (1  h) (1  s)] @x^s
@ps
+ sNw^s + spsN
@w^s
@ps
> 0
@L
@ph
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@ph
+ spsN
@w^s
@ph
> 0630
respectively. Now the governments optimal choice of purchases in the ostensibly healthy
and sick markets satisfy
'N (1  s) x^s = phNw^h + @L
@ph
@ph
@h
+
@L
@ps
+= z}|{
@ps
@h
(31)
'Nsx^s = psNw^s +
@L
@ps
@ps
@s
+
@L
@ph
+= z}|{
@ph
@s
(32)
Likewise, the governments optimal choice of sanctions in the respective markets satises635
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Two things are immediately apparent. First, it may be optimal for the government to
purchase or ban sales of ostensibly healthy chickens as well as ostensibly sick chickens.
This is simply because the risk of false negatives (1  s), which yields a positive health640
benet (the left-hand side of (31)) to purchasing ostensibly healthy chickens.
Second, conditions (31) and (32) resemble condition (22) for  while (33) and (34)
resemble condition (23) for f in the fully incomplete information model. The primary
distinction is the addition of cross-market price e¤ects (marked) of each intervention. It is
unclear whether these have the same or opposite sign as same-market price e¤ect of these645
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interventions, and therefore whether these e¤ects are marginal benets or marginal costs
of each intervention. If, for example, the cross-market price e¤ect of purchases is positive
and that of sanctions is negative, then each intervention will have the same price e¤ects in
secondary markets as in primary markets and those e¤ects will additional marginal costs of
purchases and benet of sanctions.650
A simple and likely realistic special case that yields an even closer correspondence be-
tween the partially incomplete case and the fully incomplete information case is one which
makes the following additional assumptions. First, there are no false positive diagnosis of
u in chickens. This implies h = 1 and that ostensibly sick chickens are all actually sick.
Second, consumers value actually sick chickens and thus ostensibly sick chickens at price655
zero. Therefore, third, the government buys all ostensibly sick chickens (at price zero) and
does not bother sanctioning the sale of these chickens. In this case the market clearing
conditions become
Nw^h = Dh (q^h; f; h; ph; 0)
Nw^s = Ds (0; 0; 1; 0; 0)660
All cross-market e¤ects of interventions can be ignored because the ostensibly sick chicken
market is e¤ectively shut down. The governments only remaining choices are the fraction
of ostensibly healthy chickens to buy and the sanctions to impose on the market for those
chickens. The optimality conditions for the governments choice are nearly identical to (22)
and (23), except that the relevant market is that for ostensibly healthy chickens and
@L
@ph
= 'N (1  h) (1  s) @x^s
@ph
+ hphNw^h + hphN
@w^h
@ph
> 0
which di¤ers from the direct e¤ect of price on the government loss in the full information
case most importantly due to its accounting for false negatives (1  s) in the ostensibly
healthy chicken market.14
5 Discussion
This paper attempts a systematic analysis of optimal procurement policy for a government665
seeking to cull chickens infected with bird u. It accounts for the ecology of u in chickens
and the e¤ect of government intervention on market supply and demand. It also examines
the challenge posed by exports, the limited policy value of imports, and complications raised
by virulence evolution. It also shows that its approach to modeling markets in chickens
is largely robust to the introduction of imperfect diagnostic technology for identication of670
sick chickens.
14 [Explore the e¤ect of changes to sensitivity s.]
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Nevertheless, the paper has more than a few notable omissions. First, it fails to account
for di¤erences between large and small chicken farmers. The cost of enforcing sanctions on
large farmers may be smaller than those on small farmers. Moreover, larger farmers may
be more likely to change their infection control activities in response to price. If that is the675
case, the government may want to adopt di¤erent procurement policies for, that is, price
discriminate between, large and small farmers. Second, the model in this paper does not
account for farmersanticipation of government purchases. If, for example, the government
did not simply purchase chickens but rather announced that it would purchase chickens when
it discovered a u outbreak among chickens, then farmers may have an incentive to practice680
lax infection control to trigger government purchases, which raise price. This contrasts with
the nding in this draft that government purchases simply raise price and thus infection
control. Third, an important policy that governments might employ to prevent outbreaks
among chickens is vaccination of chickens. This will have important e¤ects on the evolution
of the virus and thus the probability that the vaccine will fail. It will also alter the supply685
of chickens, and thus the costs of an outbreak should vaccination fail. Finally, the paper
examines the e¤ect of interventions given steady state in the ecology and evolution of u. If
the time scale for economic dynamics is much shorter than the time scale for ecological and
evolutionary dynamics, then it may be necessary to examine the non-steady state impacts
of government policy. We shall tackle these and other complications in future drafts.690
References
[1] Backyard poultry ban in Jakarta. BBC News, January 17, 2007.
[2] Indonesia to vaccinate chickens against bird u. Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2006.
[3] Roy M. Anderson and Robert M. May. Infectious Diseases of Humans: Dynamics and Control. Oxford
University Press, 1991.695
[4] Saskatchewan Lung Association. Time Line of TB in Canada: 1950 - Govt Pays Farmers for TB Cattle.
[5] Ted Bergstrom. Puzzles: On the Economics of Crime and Conscation. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 4(3):171178, 1990.
[6] Maciej F. Boni and Marcus W. Feldman. Evolution of antibiotic resistance by human and bacterial
niche construction. Evolution, 59(3):477491, March 2005.700
[7] Maciej F. Boni, Julia R. Gog, Viggo Andreasen, and Freddy B. Christiansen. Inuenza drift and
epidemic size: the race between generating and escaping immunity. Theor. Popul. Biol., 65:179191,
2004.
[8] David Brown. Poultry, Not Wild Birds, Most Often Carries Deadly Avian Flu to Africa. Washington
Post, page A14, February 16, 2006.705
24
[9] Gardner Brown and David F. Layton. A Market Solution for Preserving Biodiversity: The Black Rhino.
In Jason F. Shogren and John Tschirhart, editors, Protecting Species in the United States, pages 3250.
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[10] Edward Cody. China to Vaccinate Billions of Birds, Campaign Aims to Stem Avian Flu. Washington
Post, page A15, November 16, 2006.710
[11] Congressional Budget O¢ ce. A Potential Inuenza Pandemic: Possible Macroeconomic E¤ects and
Policy Issues. December 8, 2005.
[12] Troy Day. Parasite transmission modes and the evolution of virulence. Evolution, 55(12):23892400,
2001.
[13] Troy Day and Sylvain Gandon. Insights from Prices equation into evolutionary epidemiology. In715
Z. Feng, U. Dieckmann, and S. Levin, editors, Disease evolution: concepts, models, data analyses,
pages 2343. American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 2006.
[14] Department for Environment, Food and Rural A¤airs, United Kingdom. General Q&A, Section 9:
Financial issues.
[15] Neil Ferguson, Roy Anderson, and Sunetra Gupta. The e¤ect of antibody-dependent enhancement720
on the transmission dynamics and persistence of multi-strain pathogens. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA,
96:790794, January 1999.
[16] S. Gandon, V. A. A. Jansen, and M. van Baalen. Host life history and the evolution of parasite virulence.
Evolution, 55(5):1056 1062, May, 2001.
[17] Sylvain Gandon, Margaret J. Mackinnon, Sean Nee, and Andrew F. Read. Imperfect vaccines and the725
evolution of pathogen virulence. Nature, 414:751756, 2001.
[18] Masato Hatta and Yoshihiro Kawaoka. The continued pandemic threat posed by avian inuenza viruses
in Hong Kong. Trends Microbiol., 10(7):340344, Jul 2002.
[19] T. Horimoto and Y. Kawaoka. Pandemic threat posed by avian inuenza a viruses. Clin. Microbiol.
Rev., 14(1):129 149, January, 2001.730
[20] Helmut Knolle. Host density and the evolution of parasite virulence. J. Theor. Biol., 136:199207,
1989.
[21] Michael Kremer and Charles Morcom. Elephants. American Economic Review, 90(1):212234, 2000.
[22] Chang-Won Lee, Dennis A. Senne, and David L. Suarez. E¤ect of vaccine use in the evolution of
mexican lineage h5n2 avian inuenza virus. Journal of Virology, 78(15):83728381, August 2004.735
[23] Dean Lueck and Je¤rey A. Michael. Preemptive habitat destruction under the endangered species act.
Journal of Law and Economics, 46:2760, April 2003.
[24] Robert M. May and Martin Nowak. Coinfection and the evolution of parasite virulence. Proc. R. Soc.
B, 261(1361):209 215, 1995.
[25] Donald G. McNeil. As Other Asian Nations Have Moved to Control Bird Flu, It is Rapidly Spiraling740
in Indonesia. New York Times, July 21, 2006.
25
[26] Christopher J. L. Murray, Alan D. Lopez, Brian Chin, Dennis Feehan, and Kenneth H. Hill. Estimation
of potential global pandemic inuenza mortality on the basis of vital registry data from the 191820
pandemic: a quantitative analysis. Lancet, 368:22112218, 2007.
[27] National Research Council. Evaluation of the Cooperative State-Federal Bovine Tuberculosis Eradication745
Program. National Academy Press, 1994.
[28] BBC News. BSE: The long search for the facts. August 29, 2000.
[29] Martin Nowak and Robert M. May. Superinfection and the evolution of parasite virulence. Proc. R.
Soc. B, 255:8189, 1994.
[30] F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman. Niche contruction. Am. Nat.,750
147(4):641648, April 1996.
[31] F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman. Niche Construction: The Neglected
Process in Evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003.
[32] Tomas Philipson. Economic epidemiology and infectious diseases. In A.J. Cuyler and J.P. Newhouse,
editors, Handbook of Health Economics, volume 2, chapter 33, pages 17611799. Elsevier, 2000.755
[33] A.H. Ramlah. Production aspects of village chicken in the South-East Asian Region. In The Scope
and E¤ect of Family Poultry Research and Development. International Network for Family Poultry
Development, 1999.
[34] C.V. Reddy and S. Qudratullah. Strategic feeding supplementation through locally available resources.
In Rural Development with a Focus on Employment, Income and Role of Women, volume 1, New Delhi,760
India, September 2-5, 1996. XX Worlds Poultry Congress.
[35] Jeremy Rushton, Rommy Viscarra, Emmanuelle Guerne Bleich, and Anni McLeod. Impact of avian
inuenza outbreaks in the poultry sectors of ve South East Asian countries (Cambodia, Indonesia,
Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam) outbreak costs, responses and potential long term control. Technical
report, FAO, 2006.765
[36] R. G. Webster, W. J. Bean, O. T. Gorman, T. M. Chambers, and Y. Kawaoka. Evolution and ecology
of inuenza A viruses. Microbiol. Rev., 56:152179, 1992.
[37] World Bank and Food and Agriculture Organization. Enhancing Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian
Inuenza in Devloping Countries Through Compensation: Issues and Good Practice. International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2006.770
[38] World Bank, Global Program for Avian Inuenza and Human Pandemic. Economic impact of avian
u.
[39] World Health Organization. Avian inuenza ("bird u") - Fact sheet, February 2006.
[40] World Health Organization. Cumulative Number of Conrmed Human Cases of Avian Inuenza
A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO, March 29, 2007.775
[41] Nicholas Zamiska. Some chickens carry bird u withough illness. Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2005.
26
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Anup Malani 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 amalani@uchicago.edu 
  
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
For a listing of papers 1–299 please go to Working Papers at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
 
300. Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006) 
301. Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006) 
302. Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols (August 2006) 
303. Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006) 
304. Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (September 2006) 
305. Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006) 
306. M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs 
Are Low (September 2006) 
307. Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance 
(September 2006) 
308. Randal C. Picker, Who Should Regulate Entry into IPTV and Municipal Wireless? (September 
2006) 
309. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September 2006) 
310. David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006) 
311. Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 
(October 2006) 
312. Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006) 
313. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors 
Pay Less? (November 2006) 
314. Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law (November 
2006) 
315. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth without Markets? (November 2006) 
316. Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006) 
317. Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and 
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (December 2006) 
318. Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (December 
2006) 
319. Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006) 
320. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and 
Commutations (January 2007) 
321. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to 
Habermas) (January 2007) 
322. Cass R. Sunstein, Completely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007) 
323. Albert H. Choi and Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (January 2007) 
324. Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007) 
325. Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable 
Accommodation, Balancing and Stigmatic Harms (January 2007) 
326. Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007) 
327. David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and 
Doctrine in the Corporate Tax (January 2007) 
328. Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comments on “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design” (January 2007) 
329. Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal 
(January 2007) 
330. Randal C. Picker, Pulling a Rabbi Out of His Hat: The Bankruptcy Magic of Dick Posner 
(February 2007) 
331. Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic (Libertarian) 
Authoritarian (February 2007) 
  
332. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? (February 
2007) 
333. Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For (March 2007) 
334. Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March 2007) 
335. Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution. 
Part II: State Level Analysis (March 2007) 
336. Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007) 
337. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act (March 2007) 
338. M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps (March 2007) 
339.  Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive (April 2007) 
340. Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses (May 2007) 
341. Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities (June 2007) 
342. David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us about Taxation? (June 2007) 
343. David S. Abrams and Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the 
Philadelphia Bail Experiment (June 2007) 
344. Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions 
(June 2007) 
345. Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posners, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis (July 2007) 
346. Daniel Kahneman and Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (July 2007) 
347. Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions (July 2007) 
348. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns (July 2007) 
349. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination (July 2007) 
350. Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela Gross, 
Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation, 
Governmentality, and Race (July 2007) 
351. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try This at Home”:  Posner as Political Economist (July 2007) 
352. Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the United States 
(August 2007) 
353. David S. Abrams and Marianne Bertrand, Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race? (August 
2007) 
354. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice (August 2007) 
355. David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities (August 2007) 
356. David S. Abrams, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration using 
Sentencing Enhancements (August 2007) 
357. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain 
Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (August 2007) 
358. Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, Consuption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income 
Taxation (September 2007) 
359. Dougals G. Baird and M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money (September 2007) 
360. William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Causation in Tort: General Populations vs. Individual 
Cases (September 2007) 
361. Richard McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two 
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (September 2007) 
362. Richard McAdams, Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v. Hollingsworth (September 
2007) 
363. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent (October 
2007) 
364. Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation (October 2007) 
365. David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity (October 2007) 
366. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0 (October 2007) 
367. Jonathan R. Nash and Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the 
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review (October 2007) 
368. Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review (November 2007) 
369. Anup Malani, Maciej F. Boni, Abraham Wickelgren, and Ramanan Laxminarayan, Controlling 
Avian Influenza in Chickens (November 2007) 
